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Fishburne and D'Alemberte: The Unicameral Legislature

THE UNICAMERAL LEGISLATURE
TALBoT D'ALEMBERTE* AND CHARLES

C. FISHBURNE,

JR.**

The United States Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims, and its
companion cases held that state legislatures must apportion both
houses "as nearly of equal population as is practicable." 2 If the decision is implemented, leadership in most states must grapple with
the difficult problem of reapportioning both houses.
In view of the many problems involved, it may not be irreverent
to suggest that the time has come to abandon the bicameral legislature and to adopt a single chamber. This system may be the logical
answer to several obvious questions: Why is it necessary to have two
houses organized on a population basis? When both chambers are
apportioned on a population basis, isn't a particular county or district as well represented by ten "representatives" as by those same
representatives and a "senator?" 3
These questions have been asked by many people. The press has
called attention to the organization of the Nebraska Legislature 4 and
the issue is vital enough to have caused one Florida newspaper to take
a poll of voter opinion on the subject. 5
The reapportionment cases provide the crisis that makes it possible
to foresee change, but in implementing this change we can scarcely
afford the luxury of ignoring the fundamental requirements of government. There are many arguments in favor of a unicameral legislature
as the most effective organization to accomplish the purpose of the
legislative branch - the formulation of policy.
A study of comparative government teaches us that there is no
"natural order" for legislative structure. Although we have known
the bicameral system throughout most of our history, the national
*Talbot D'Alemberte, B.A. 1955, University of the South; LL.B. 1962, University of Florida; Member of Miami, Florida, Bar.
**Charles C. Fishburne, Jr., B.S. 1942, United States Military Academy; M.A.
1957, University of Maryland; Ph.D. candidate, Florida State University.
1. 84 Sup. Ct. 1362 (1964). For a full discussion of this series of cases see
Baldwin & Laughlin, The Reapportionment Cases: A Study in the Constitutional
Adjudication Process, 17 U. FtA. L. Rav. 301 (1964).
2. Id. at 1390.
3. There are other possibilities. Florida state Senator Verle Pope has suggested that senators should qualify from apportioned districts, but should be
elected in state-wide elections.
4. For example, articles have been noted in the Miami Herald, Miami News,
Tallahassee Democrat, St. Petersburg [Ea.] Times, and Burlington [Vt.] Free
Press.
5. Result: favoring the bicameral 39%, favoring the unicameral 18%, undecided 43%. St. Petersburg Times, Sept. 20, 1964, §B, p. 4, col. 1.
[355]
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government under the Articles of Confederation had a unicameral
legislature, and, as we shall see presently, some of our states had early
experience with unicameral legislatures. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Benjamin Franklin favored a unicameral legislature
for our national government. 6
Among foreign governments, we find varied experiences. Sweden
once used four houses. In Canada, all provinces except Quebec use the
unicameral form. France, which long had three chambers, now has
two.
Our own experience is an interesting blend of tradition and pragmatic action, for all of our states, except Nebraska, have retained two
houses while our larger cities have abandoned the bicameral assembly
for a single chamber.
In considering this topic we shall examine the historical background as well as the existing nature of legislative structure both
unicameral and bicameral. We will then examine the advantages and
disadvantages, as expressed in arguments and tested in practice, and
finally endeavor to draw some tentative conclusions.
BRITAIN AS THE "MOTHER OF PARLIAMENTS"

Most Americans probably regard the bicameral legislature as a
part of "our way of life," acknowledging an indebtedness to Britain
for its role as the "Mother of Parliaments." What is perhaps less
widely appreciated is the fact that Britain after exporting her traditions, came before the end of the last century to have what is, for
most practical purposes, a single-house assembly, while maintaining
the traditional two-house form.7
The British development of parliamentary institutions was never
frozen at any level by a written constitution, but the period of greatest
colonial expansion was at a time when both chambers were fairly
vital. The British enthusiasm for things British was contagious and
most of the colonies imitated the institutions of Westminster.
It was, then, the British example, but it was a Frenchman's interpretation and observations of English institutions that influenced
the concepts of government of our "founding fathers." 8 That Frenchman, Baron de Montesquieu, had already earned a wide reputation
as an author and administrator when he traveled to England in 1729.
6.

BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED

STATES 197 (1961).
7.

Garfinkel, The Constitution and the Legislature (1961)

(Michigan Consti-

tutional Convention Studies No. 7, prepared for the Constitutional Convention
Preparatory Commission, State of Michigan).
8. James Madison studied Montesquieu's work at Princeton and could quote
passages many years later.

VANDERBILT,

POWERS AND ITS PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE

THE

DOCTRINE

OF THE SEPARATION

OF

(1953).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol17/iss3/2

2

1964]

Fishburne and D'Alemberte: The Unicameral Legislature

THE UNICAMERAL

LEGISLATURE

He stayed for several years, observing English institutions and, on
occasion, visiting Parliament for debates.9 In 1748, he published
The Spirit of the Laws in which he examined the English political
structure. His remarks on the separation of powers were widely read
and are, even today, frequently quoted.1o
He also commented on the manner in which the British legislative
power was split between two bodies, and many observers read in his
remarks the theory of "checks and balances."'13 As with other things
English, he voiced his approval. It is his reasoning, not his conclusion, that is of particular interest today. The two houses are neces1 2
sary, according to Montesquieu, because:
[TMhere are always persons distinguished by their birth, riches,
or honors; but were they to be confounded with the common
people, and to have only the weight of a single vote like the
rest, the common liberty would be their slavery, and they would
have no interest in supporting .it, as most of the popular resolutions would be against them. The share they have therefore in the legislature ought to be proportioned to their other
advantages in the states; which happens only when they form
a body that has a right to check the licentiousness of the people,
as the people have a right to oppose any encroachment of theirs.
Thus, although Montesquieu did speak of the virtues of a twohouse legislature, his reasons are not reasons that would find general
acceptance in a country dedicated to a broader democracy. 3 At any
rate, there is no doubt that Montesquieu's view of Westminster would
not hold up today for the House of Lords no longer has the "right
to check the licentiousness of the people." In modem practice, the
House of Lords is not an equal chamber."" If Montesquieu were a
political anglophile today, he would have to delete many passages
from his famous book.
9. He reported these debates with some accuracy despite the fact that he
learned his English from an Irishman in Italy. SHAcararON, MONTESqUIEU, A
CRITICAL BIOGRAPHY (1961).
10. In this article we distinguish the often confused doctrines of "separation
of powers" and legislative "checks and balances." We do not mean to argue
against the separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches.
11. All commentators do not agree. SABINE, A HisTORY OF PoLrIcAL THEORY
(1954) expresses doubts about Montesquieu's real meaning. The supremacy of
parliament was settled in 1688, observes Sabine, and "checks and balances" was
not the dominant idea of the British "Constitution," even in Montesquieu's time.
12. MONTEsQUiEU, THE SPmrr OF THE LAWs 115-16 (6th ed. Nugent transi.
1793).
13. Montesquieu was not a democrat. He favored a limited monarchy.
14. The House of Lords may be entirely by-passed by Commons and since
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AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION

Montesquieu's words and the English example did have an impact, and most Americans are accustomed to the bicameral system for
state and national legislatures.5 Less well known is the fact that several states have had unicameral legislatures in the past.
Among the original colonies along the Atlantic seaboard, all had
bicameral legislatures except Pennsylvania and Delaware. In the
reorganizations that followed the Declaration of Independence in
1776, bicameral legislatures were established in all cases except in
Georgia, Pennsylvania, and in the fourteenth state, Vermont.
The constitutions establishing unicameral legislatures were associated with democratic groups. In all of these legislatures there
was a frill in the form of an executive council (or board of censors),
which was selected to meet separately to consider or review legislation. 16 In Georgia this group was selected by the members of the
Assembly, and final power rested with the House of Assembly.- In
Pennsylvania and Vermont, the executive group had more power.
Following the establishment of the new national government, and
as a reaction to broadly based democratic control, the constitutions
of these three states were changed and the unicameral system abandoned for a dual-house system.' 8 The experience was brief and inconclusive and without any real lessons for our era.' 9
UNICAMERALISM IN NEBRASKA

The story of how the change was made from a bicameral to a unicameral legislative body in Nebraska is a study in politics that warrants separate treatment. Foremost is the fact that the activation of
the unicameral house in 1937 was the culmination of a campaign by
some Nebraskans stretching over a twenty-four year period. Thus,
by the time of adoption not only the lawmakers, but the public as
well, were thoroughly educated on unicameralism.
there is no judicial review of parliamentary action and the executive is responsible
to Commons, there is no effective "check" or "balance" to the action by the
Commons. Of course the Commons is still the "lower" house in British parlance.
15. This is an anomoly- the institutions copied by the Americans were frozen
into written constitutions while the British have seen fit to make sweeping changes.
16. THORPE, AMERICAN CHARTERS, CONSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIC LAWS (1909).
17. For a full discussion see SAYE, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF GEORCIA
(1948).
18. Vermont kept its unicameral legislature until 1836. Pennsylvania and
Georgia were quick to abandon theirs following periods of instability.
19.

CARROLL, THE UNICAMERAL LEGISLATURE OF VERMONT 75

(1933) states that

the author finds nothing in the Vermont experience that supports an assumption
of superiority of the bicameral over the unicameral system.
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Playing a prominent role in this process were many persons, but
the champion of unicameralism in the years nearest adoption was a
highly popular and deeply trusted Nebraska politician, United States
Senator George W. Norris. Norris, a fiery Republican liberal, endorsed the idea as a reform measure as early as 1923.20
In 1934 Norris had an opportunity to campaign for his ideas when
the voters of Nebraska were offered a constitutional amendment providing for a single-house legislature. Working with a poorly financed
organization and opposed by leaders in both parties and the major
newspapers, Norris stayed on the road in an extensive speaking campaign. 21 It was a bitter campaign and at one point Norris commented
on his opposition, saying, "If I offered the Lord's Prayer as an amendment, they would fight it."22
The fact that it was a successful campaign is certain, for the
voters approved the unicameral legislature by a vote of 286,086 to
193,152. Not so certain are the causes of this victory for many factors
were involved: Norris' personal magnetism, the depression era, and
voter approval of the arguments concerning cost and efficiency. Also,
the new system was tied to a "non-partisan" plan whereby the legislators would run and be selected without party labels. This factor
may have appealed to the voters, but it certainly stiffened opposition
by political leaders. 23 At any rate, by the time of the election, a decisive majority of the Nebraska electorate was convinced that it
24
wanted the change.
In evaluating the success of the Nebraska experiment, we must
not overlook the other differences in Nebraska's lawmaking organization and process that have attended the change from bicameralism.
The consequences of the change to unicameralism have inspired
numerous reports and commentaries, almost entirely favorable, but
not always accurate in their implications that Nebraska's apparently
highly efficient legislature owes its success wholly to unicameralism.
One must take into account, for example, the fact that Nebraska has

20. New York Times, Jan. 28, 1923, §8, p. 12, col. I. In 1920 the National

Municipal League drafted a model state constitution that featured a unicameral

legislature, and many states had dallied with the unicameral idea in the early part
of this century. Among them were Arizona, California, Colorado, Minnesota, and
New York. SENNING, THE ONE HousE LEGISLATURE (1937).
21. NoRuus, FIGrING LiBERAL (1945).
22. Nebraska University School of Journalism, Behind These Doors Is the
Story of Nebraska's Unicameral Legislature (Depth Report No. 1 1961), quoting

the McCook [Neb.] Gazette on election eve.
23. George Norris tells of an offer of Democratic support if he would drop
the nonpartisan features. He refused saying that he wanted the entire package

or none at all.
24.

NoRois, supra note

JOHNSON,

THE

21.

UNICAMERAL LEGISLATURE

131-37 (1938).
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adopted and used such devices as the legislative council, the legislative reference bureau, bill drafting services, and the electric roll call.
Moreover, before unicameralism, Nebraska had, and has retained, a
rule limiting the introduction of bills to the first twenty days except
under exceptional conditions.
The facts, however, do clearly demonstrate that the Nebraska
unicameral legislature has acquired or improved all the modern
services noted above, and that this has been done for roughly one25
half of the cost incurred by the bicameral legislature. Further, the
unicameral legislature devotes more time to the business of lawmaking,26 provides complete distribution of all bills to all members
before final voting, and has multiplied salaries of members by a
factor of six times that paid during the last (1935) bicameral session.
In other words, for roughly half the number of dollars, the purchasing value of which has shrunk far below that of the earlier period,
Nebraska, in its first twenty years of unicameralism, has financed a
legislature exhibiting all the hallmarks of modernized legislative
27

operation among the fifty states.

It would be misleading to attribute this monetary economy wholly
to the unicameral legislature. Nevertheless, it is significant that the
present body is composed of only ten more members (43) than the
earlier body had in its upper house, and the unified house reflects
only fifteen standing committees compared with an earlier total of
sixty-one. This facilitates the regulation of committee work and
utilizes time effectively without distraction from plenary sessions of
the house where bills are introduced, debated, and voted upon in an
orderly manner. In short, the facts support the contention that the
unicameral body does facilitate economy in the resources committed
to lawmaking.
There is another aspect of the Nebraska operation that, since it
apparently is not common to both types of structure, invites closer
investigation. This may be described as the "single-focal-point" as
distinguished from the "double-focal-point-linked-by-joint-committee"
aspect. Where there are two houses, the public and the press must be
very alert to keep track of the progress of legislation. In this respect
25. The comparison is made between the last twenty years of the bicameral
legislature and the first twenty years of the unicameral. No adjustment is made
for the shrinkage in purchasing power.
26. In comparative periods the single-house records show that less legislation
was introduced and more was passed than by the bicameral legislature. NoRRIs,
supra note 21.
27. See Nebraska Legislature, Brief Comparison of the Bicameral and Unicameral Legislative Systems and Rules and Laws Governing Their Operation in

Nebraska (1959); also relative to salary increases see
GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES

THE

COUNCIL OF STATE

36-37 (1962).
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we must necessarily rely more upon commentary than factual data.
The fundamental issue raised here is whether the unicameral successor in Nebraska is more responsive and responsible to its masters, the
electorate.
Only six years after the change was voted, the view of the press,
which had expressed vigorous opposition, was exemplified by this
28
opinion:
The unicameral legislature is the newspaper man's paradise.
As a legislative reporter his mission is to keep the public informed as to the nature, purpose, and progress of legislation.
The unicameral simplifies this task. Everything is open and
above board. There are no secret meetings from which he is
barred, and every facility is afforded for keeping track of the
work of the lawmakers. Having observed the old way and the
new, I unequivocally say that the new way is immeasurably
the better.
A few years later another Nebraskan, Dr. John P. Senning, underscored the increased interest, awareness, and participation on the part
of the citizens, which had developed subsequent to the change.29
Senning also had some pertinent comments to make on the lobbying relationship. Lobbying was, to be sure, still present and particularly visible in the public hearings where the unicameral system adds
to public awareness of the pressures being exerted. The lack of camouflage in the unicameral house has tended to check the influence of
lobbies working in a crass manner because exposure is so easy and so
clearcut. There could be no doubt, wrote Senning, that Nebraska's
one-house legislature is much more successful in combatting lobbying
influence than was the bicameral assembly.3o These views were confirmed ten years later by the findings of a study committee of the
American Political Science Association, which addressed itself to state
legislatures. 31
Another authority, the Director of Research for the Nebraska
Legislative Council, reaffirmed these findings in 1957. Noting that
while opponents of the change in 1934 had labeled the unicameral
system "dangerous" and "un-American," Dr. Jack Rogers found that
Nebraskans "like the openness" of the single-house and its proce32
dures.

28.
MUNIC.

29.

Dobbins, Nebraska's One-House Legislature-After

Six Years, 30 NAT'L

REv. 511, 514 (1941).
Senning, UnicameralismPasses Test, 33 NAT'L MUNIC. REv. 62 (1944).

30. Senning, supra note 29, at 64-65.
31. AMERiCAN STATE LEMISLATUES 253 (Zeller ed. 1954).
32. Rogers, One House for 20 Years, 46 NAT'L MUNiC. REv. 342, 347 (1957).
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In addition to the aspects of economy and openness to the public,
already discussed, there is yet another facet that warrants comment.
Significant changes are evident in the comparative volume of bills
processed in the two types of legislatures. Statistics are available to
facilitate this comparison. They show, for example, that during the
last ten bienniums of the bicameral legislature nearly twice as many
bills were introduced than during the first ten bienniums of the
unicameral body. Under the bicameral body, less than one out of
four of these bills became law, resulting in the actual passage of
2,268. Under the unicameral body, one out of every two bills became
33
law, resulting in the actual passage of 2,837.
This data will not support any contention that better or worse
laws were passed; however, they do illustrate that over a sustained
period of time it has been possible for a forty-three member, onehouse legislature to make a comparable number of apparently suitable
laws while considering about half the number of proposals that confronted its one hundred thirty-three member, two-house predecessor.
During the same periods the unicameral body required a total of
one hundred forty-two more days to do its job than the bicameral
body; however, the general trend of length of sessions (including
special sessions) reveals a fairly steady rise from a low of around
eighty days in the beginning of the forty-year period up to one hundred fourteen days at its end.
After examining the record of Nebraska's experience over the
past four decades, it is difficult to disagree with the evaluation by the
34
National Municipal League:
Most of the claimed virtues of unicameralism have been realized in the Nebraska experience during the past 25 years.
Nebraska's single house with 43 members has permitted more
easily the pinpointing of legislative responsibility than in some
of the sprawling two-house legislatures. Fewer bills have been
introduced and a higher percentage of them passed. The prestige of membership has risen and in the view of many observers
the quality of candidates.
On the other hand, and in spite of the more extensive
experience with the bicameral system, there are no data to support the claim that two houses result in better policies and
more carefully written laws. There are no data to support the
claim that the second house is a constructive check against
hasty action.

33. Nebraska Legislature, supra note 27.
34.

NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION 43 (6th ed. 1963).
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In adopting the unicameral form for its Model State Constitution, the
National Municipal League found that a one-house legislature can be
at once more representative in character, more efficient in operation,
and more responsible politically than a bicameral body.35
BICAMERALISM V. UNICAMERALISM:

A THEORETICAL

VIEW

With this background of the Nebraska experience, we can turn
to a more balanced consideration of the virtues of the two systems as
viewed by the political theorists.
In presenting the arguments for and against the bicameral and
unicameral forms of legislative assemblies the object is not to claim
or to prove that one is more satisfactory than the other. Rather, we
wish to present the arguments in an open question- a question that
needs to be perennially reviewed to evaluate the manner in which
institutions are employed. Arguments over the relative merits of the
two systems often have obscured the fact that many problems exist
irrespective of the structure.
It is necessary, therefore, to be cautious of the makeweight arguments advanced by both sides of this argument. For instance, one
of the original advocates of the unicameral legislature for Nebraska
makes the case for the fast, efficient, simple, and inexpensive government provided by the unicameral system. 36 In many respects his
arguments would apply equally to a smaller legislature, whether of
one or two houses. That is, a small legislature would gain the advantages of economy and would result in enhancing the prestige and
power of the members.
Another authority on American government has called attention
to this, pointing out that the question of structure "does not necessarily touch any of the most pressing problems now confronting our
legislatures - organizational, planning, or scientific bill-drafting." 37
Whether there is one house or two, "the size of the legislative bodies
could be reduced, and the rules of procedure could be modernized...
service agencies can be established ... adequate bill-drafting services
can also be established." 3 Indeed, steps along these lines to provide
better services have been taken by the majority of states. Consequently, as we review some of the traditional arguments pertaining to
the actual structure of the houses, it is pertinent to look between the
lines of rhetoric.
35. Id. at 43-44.
36. Senning, The One-House Legislature in Nebraska, 13 NEB. L. REv. 341
(1935).
37.

GRAVEs, AMERICAN STATE GOVE ,NMENT 193 (1953).

38.

Ibid.
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Advantages claimed for the bicameral legislature consist of the
following assertions: Two houses check each other, avoid hurried and
careless legislation, produce better legislation; they are more secure
against special interest lobbies, are more difficult to corrupt; they
make division of legislative functions such as impeachment and
origination of money bills possible; they deter usurpation of power
by the legislature and minimize despotic trends in government; they
allow better representation of different groups and areas. 39
Disadvantages attributed to the bicameral legislature include the
following contentions: Two houses are expensive; in actual practice
one house does not act as a suitable check on the other; two houses
consume too much time and delay leads to poor legislation; they encourage "buck-passing"; they entail cumbersome organization; they
do not provide suitable representation, especially where one house,
based upon geographical areas places control in a disproportionate
number of the people; they require resort to the conference committee
to resolve disputes and this leads to practices not in the best interests
40
of the people.
Shifting our attention to the proclaimed virtues of the unicameral
system, we find many of the same contentions stated in diametrically
opposite terms. For example, studies on state constitutions made in
Hawaii summarize alleged advantages as follows: One house concentrates responsibility resulting in the legislators' being motivated to do
a better job; one house costs less; one house lends greater prestige to
the job and therefore attracts better qualified people; it speeds up
the legislative process and results in better legislation; it minimizes
"buck-passing"; it is, with proportional representation, more representative of the people.4 ' Recent Michigan studies add other points,
emphasizing that the public can better recognize what transpires; the
conference committee and its abuses are eliminated; a single house
can be checked sufficiently by executive veto and judicial review. 42
In the arguments against the unicameral legislature, we again
find many of the above enumerated contentions simply turned around:
One house can increase the power of any party machine or special
interest that may have secured control; it facilitates domination of a
39. For a summary of the conventional arguments, in their broadest scope,
that have been put forward, we shall draw upon the very extensive studies prepared for constitutional conventions in Alaska, Hawaii, and Michigan. Alaska,
Public Administration Service, Constitutional Studies (1955); Hawaii, Manual on
State Constitutional Provisions (1950); Garfinkel, The Constitution and the Legislature (1961) (Michigan Constitutional Convention Studies No. 7, prepared for
the Constitutional Convention Preparatory Commission, State of Michigan).
40. Hawaii, op. cit. supra note 39, at 2.
41. Ibid.
42. Garfinkel, op. cit. supra note 39, at 20-21.
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state's diverse interests by the urban interests; there is less time
within which the public may act to combat undesirable legislation; it
will tend to become despotic and avaricious; it lacks the advantage
to improve bills through the conference committee that draws upon
43
both houses.
A moment's reflection upon the preceding collection of alleged
advantages and disadvantages of two houses or one house may cast
some light upon what, at first blush, appears to be hopelessly irresolvable. As noted earlier, either form can, and, in fact, has benefited from the provision of services such as bill drafting, legislative
reference, electric voting machines - all of which serve to free the
member of the legislature from unnecessarily delaying administrative
or clerical work and help to speed the legislative process.
Among all the points mentioned for and against, one suspects that
the essence of the debate must bear a close relationship to the question: What can two houses do that one house cannot do as well or
better? If the answer is that the one house functions as well, but
that there is a danger in allocating power to one house without the
check of a second chamber, then the argument is obviously related
to the overall distribution of powers, and a strong legislature can be
checked by a strong executive or judicial branch. In other words,
there are other ways to check a unicameral legislature than by imposing a second chamber that may confuse the organization and increase the expense of the legislative branch.
On balance, these arguments strongly suggest that the real issue
is more closely identified with the central question of apportionment.
If apportionment has received a final answer in Reynolds v. Sims,44
then we have come full circle.
CONCLUSION

What conclusions may be validly drawn from this discussion of
legislative structure? More specifically, are there any lessons of value
here to states that must now strive to adjust themselves to the requirements of reapportionment?
We know that the bicameral form of legislative body in the
United States is a result of our historical heritage, and that the popular objections to the unicameral structure are based almost wholly
upon theory rather than experience.
We have seen that the principal argument for the retention of the
bicameral system is that "it is necessary to protect the people by a
system of checks and balances." Senator George Norris of Nebraska
43. Hawaii, op. cit. supra note 39, at 2.
44.

84 Sup. Ct. 1362 (1964).
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had a witty, if somewhat glib, answer for this when he said: "After
the legislative session comes to an end and we balance the books,
we generally find that the politicians get the checks and the special
interests get the balance." 4s The senator's answer probably will not
satisfy those Americans who may have come to regard the bicameral
system as a part of "our way of life."
Undoubtedly, the dual house does check legislation for the more
cumbersome machinery makes legislation more difficult to pass. But
if we assume that bad legislation will meet this fate, we must also
realize that much good legislation may also be blocked. Otherwise,
we should be arguing that legislators exercise wisdom in reviewing
legislation by the "other" house, but fail to do so in drafting or
proposing legislation. Thus, it is interesting to note that these critics
of the unicameral system change their approach when considering
city or county government. Two legislative chambers would seem
wasteful in this context, and somehow this is different. 46 One is,
therefore, led to suspect that much of the opposition stems from
something else- most likely from fear of incurring personal loss in
terms of political influence, economic advantage, or social prestige.
If this is the case, the electorate should be informed of the facts,
and, as a beginning, lawyers should know that many outstanding
authorities, along with the majority of the people and political leaders
of Nebraska, are agreed that the unicameral system has proven very
satisfactory. This Nebraska experience has exploded the general
condemnations of the one-house system and has demonstrated that
many of the claimed advantages can, in fact, be realized within the
over-all context of an integrated state government.
The ultimate argument for the unicameral legislature may be
in the reframing of the original questions: Why have the second house
when both are to be organized on a purely democratic basis? Presumably the interests represented in both houses will at least roughly
coincide and only when we have divergent interests do we get the
checks and balances.

45. Nebraska University School of Journalism, Behind These Doors Is the
Story of Nebraska's Unicameral Legislature (Depth Report No. 1 1961), quoting
the Falls City [Neb.] Journal.
46. Also different, apparently, is the business organization. Senator Norris
used an apt similitude when he compared state government to a business organization: The governor is the president of the corporation, the legislature is the board
of directors, and the people are the stockholders. The stockholders have a right
to know what their board of directors does and how it is done. They have a right
to be able, by the record of the votes, to know whether the members of the board
of directors have properly represented the stockholders. New York Times, Jan. 28,
1923, §8, p. 12, col. I.
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In the final analysis, a person's view of this question may depend
upon his political philosophy. The person who wants little legislation passed (and that in relative obscurity) will prefer the two-house
system. The person who wants the state legislatures to involve themselves with the problems of the people and deal with those problems
openly may feel some attraction to the single-house plan.
In the political melee that will attend any attempt at reapportionment of both houses, the unicameral system should be examined.
The prospect of a simpler, dearer, more responsible, and less expensive legislative structure merits serious consideration, especially in
view of the fact that apportionment problems historically exhibit a
peculiar characteristic - they keep recurring and, by their very complexity, invite inertia. This is not the kind of check and balance that
today's problems demand.
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